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Abstract In this paper we propose a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic model for urban freight 
transportation planning which is able to characterize the interaction between freight and personal 
transportation in an urban area. The problem is formulated as a bi-level dynamic mathematical program 
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) which belongs to a class of computationally challenging problems. 
The lower level is dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) with inhomogeneous traffic that characterizes traffic 
assignment of personal transportation given the schedule of freight transportation. The upper level is a 
system optimum (SO) freight transportation planning problem which aims at minimizing the total cost to 
a truck company. A mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) reformulation is 
derived and a projected gradient algorithm is designed to solve this computationally challenging problem. 
Numerical experiments are conducted to show that when planning freight transportation the background 
traffic is nonnegligible, even though the amount of trucks compared to other vehicles traveling on the 
same network is relatively small. What’s more, in our proposed bi-level model for urban freight 
transportation planning, we find a dynamic case of a Braess-like Paradox which can provide managerial 
insights to a metropolitan planning organization (MPO) in increasing social welfare by restricting freight 
movement. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Urban freight transportation, sometimes also referred to as city logistics, aims to reduce negative 
externalities, such as emission, noise and congestion, associated with freight activity while supporting 
their economic and social development (Crainic et al. 2009). Today the problem is even more important 
and challenging with the growing number of private vehicles, soaring demand of urban freight 
transportation services and increased recognition of the need for a paradigm shift toward environmentally 
sustainable logistics and freight technologies. 
Urban freight transportation has attracted lots of research efforts in the past decades from different 
perspectives including transportation regulation, emission estimation and reduction, transportation 
planning, etc. Most studies about urban freight transportation planning modeled the problem based on a 
framework of the vehicle routing problem (VRP), with the objective of minimizing the total cost/delay to 
the carriers or truck companies while satisfying demand consumption constraints. These studies mainly 
focus on modeling freight activities. However, personal transportation and its impact on the freight 
transportation planning haven’t been well studied.   
To fill the gap mentioned above, in this paper we propose a dynamic game-theoretic model for urban 
freight transportation planning which is able to characterize the interaction between freight and personal 
transportation. Specifically, the problem is formulated as a dynamic mathematical program with 
equilibrium constraints (MPEC) which can handle the dynamic traffic assignment of inhomogeneous road 
users. Theoretical properties of this new model are discussed. To achieve tractability and guarantee 
solution quality, a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC) reformulation is 
derived. The problem finally can be solved by a proposed projected gradient algorithm. Numerical results 
show that the interaction of freight and personal transportation is nonnegligible to the truck company. 
Furthermore, by extensive numerical tests, we find a Braess-like paradox based on our proposed model 
which can provide managerial insights to a metropolitan planning organization (MPO) so that the social 
welfare may be improved by appropriate policy-making. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a comprehensive literature review and 
discuss how this paper distinguishes from and contributes to the existing body of literature. In Section 3, a 
dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic model is built for urban freight transportation planning and some 
theoretical results are provided. In Section 4, we reformulate the problem as a mathematical program with 
complementarity constraints (MPCC) and design a projected gradient algorithm to solve it. Numerical 
experiments are presented and the results are analyzed in Section 5. In the end, Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The intercity freight transportation assignment problems that focus on the forecast of transportation 
flows were intensively studied in 1970s and 1980s. Friesz et al. (1983) provided a survey of the 
predicative intercity freight network models and discussed the advantage of combined shipper-carrier 
models and spatial equilibrium models. Friesz et al. (1986) and Harker and Friesz’s (1986a, 1986b) 
proposed to sequentially and simultaneously model and solve a shipper-carrier static freight assignment 
problem, respectively. More recently, Agrawal and Ziliaskopoulos (2006) proposed a dynamic shipper-
carrier freight assignment model and an iterative approach to solve for the shippers’ equilibrium solution. 
Nevertheless, due to the need in modeling each shipper and carrier’s sub-network, the shipper-carrier 
approach is difficult to implemented practice (Crainic et al. 2007). Different from the shipper-career 
approach, some transshipment network assignment models were proposed to solely address carriers’ 
transport operations (See Guélat et al. (1990) and Chow and Ritchie (2012) for some examples).  
According to Crainic (2000), intercity freight transportation, also known as long-haul transportation, is 
a tactical (medium-term) planning issue for a transportation agency, while urban freight transportation 
(city logistics) is more of an operational (short-term) planning issue which is mostly modeled under the 
framework of a vehicle routing problem (VRP). The common objective of such models are to minimize 
the total cost/delay to the carriers or truck companies while satisfying demand consumption constraints by 
designing optimal pick-up or delivery routes from one or several nodes (depots) to a set of other nodes in 
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a transportation network. Vehicle routing problem with time windows (VRPTW) is an extension of VRP 
which incorporates time constraints for freight pick-up and delivery. Some discussions or surveys of 
VRP/VRPTW can be found in, e.g. Kulkarni and Bhave (1985), Golden and Assad (1986), Laporte (1992) 
and Kallehauge et al. (2005). Specifically, in urban freight transportation planning studies, Taniguchi and 
Thompson (2002) studied a stochastic VRPTW which incorporated travel time variance. Crainic et al. 
(2009) proposed an integrated model that addresses short-term scheduling of operations and resource 
management based on a two-tiered distribution structure. Two new problem classes which are extensions 
of VRPTW were introduced and possible solution avenues were discussed. The two-tiered city logistics 
model was further extended to address demand uncertainty in Crainic et al. (2011). However, as 
Ambrosini and Routhier (2004) and Paglione (2006) noted, among the urban freight transportation 
planning literature, there is a lack of behavioral models that characterize the interactions of private 
economic and transport agents.  
Nonetheless, the study of competition and cooperation among different road users is not new. Yang et 
al. (2007) incorporated the routing behaviors of system optimum (SO), user equilibrium (UE) and 
Cournot-Nash (CN) travelers using a static Stackelberg game with perfect information. In particular, the 
SO traveler is the leader and the UE and CN travelers are the followers. The UE and CN travelers make 
their routing decisions in a mixed equilibrium behavior given the SO traveler’s routing decision, while the 
SO traveler optimizes its routes considering the potential reactions of UE and CN travelers towards its 
routing decision. Since urban freight transportation planning deals with short-term operations and 
planning issues, a model that can dynamically characterize interactions of road users is necessary.  
Dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) captures the routing behaviors of individual travelers in a spatial 
network in a way that the effective unit delay/cost, including early/late arrival penalties, of traveling on all 
utilized path at any departure time is identical (see Friesz (2010) for a detailed discussion of DUE). As the 
first to model timely interactions of freight and personal transportation, this paper presents a dynamic 
Stackelberg game in which the leader is a truck company aiming at optimizing the freight transportation 
and the followers are individual travelers whose travel behaviors follow DUE with inhomogeneous traffic. 
The formulation belongs to a challenging set of mathematical programs which is known as dynamic 
mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Moreover the time shifts in the DUE model 
make solving this dynamic MPEC even more challenging. Friesz and Mookherjee (2006) proposed to use 
an implicit fixed point algorithm to accommodate the time shifts and based on this idea. Friesz et al. 
(2007) discussed two algorithms to solve a dynamic optimal toll problem with equilibrium constraints 
(DOTPEC) which is a specific type of dynamic MPEC. Yao et al. (2012) introduced toll price uncertainty 
into the DOTPEC and proposed a bi-level heuristic method to solve the resulting robust DOTPEC. 
Distinct from the DOTPEC, the lower level of our model is DUE with inhomogeneous traffic which 
requires a refinement of the traffic dynamics and network loading. Whence, in this paper, we propose a 
new dynamic MPEC model and discuss its theoretical properties. Moreover, to balance the quality of 
solutions and computational efficiency, instead of using heuristic algorithms we propose a MPCC 
reformulation and design a projected gradient algorithm to unlock the problem.  
 
3. DYNAMIC STACKELBERG GAME-THEORETIC MODELING 
In this study, we consider two types of traffic: freight transportation by trucks and personal 
transportation by private vehicles. Note that public transportation by buses is ignored in this model since 
its travel behavior (departure time and route choice) is almost fixed and independent of the behaviors of 
other vehicles. So in this paper, by personal transportation, we refer to private vehicles only. Trucks are 
controlled by a truck company who aims at minimizing the total transportation cost/delay while satisfying 
the travel demand (i.e., the total number of trucks required to travel between each origin-destination (O-D) 
pair to transport freight). Each private vehicle is driven by an individual road user who wants to minimize 
the personal travel cost/delay in the same time horizon. Thus, the two types of traffic compete for the 
limited road capacity. Since the individual road users do not cooperate, the impact of each private 
vehicle’s travel behavior on the network traffic is not comparable to that of the truck company. So we 
model the problem as a Stackelberg game where the truck company is the leader and the other individual 
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road users are the followers. We assume that private vehicles’ travel behaviors follow dynamic user 
equilibrium given those of the trucks. This assumption may not hold for a single-day dynamic traffic 
assignment problem since it takes time to reach traffic equilibrium. However, we argue that the 
assumption is acceptable for a truck company that aims at making an optimal everyday transportation 
schedule in a long time horizon, especially when the travel demands are steady over time.  
To understand the interaction of the two types of traffic in the Stackelberg game, we need to address 
the following questions: 1) How do the trucks’ travel behaviors affect the private vehicles? 2) 
Considering the potential reactions of private vehicles towards its decision, how should the truck 
company schedule its freight transportation? In the remainder of this section, Section 3.1 and 3.2 answer 
the former question and Section 3.3 addresses the latter one. 
 
3.1 Dynamic User Equilibrium with Inhomogeneous Traffic 
We denote the time interval of interest by 10 , ft t +⎡ ⎤ ⊂ ℜ⎣ ⎦ . We assume that for all travelers (trucks and 
private vehicles) there is an identical desired time to arrive at their destinations, AT . Note that this 
assumption can be relaxed by allowing different desired arrival time and we can just classify travelers 
with the same desired arrival time into the same group and model each group explicitly in the DUE which, 
although complicating the problem formulation, does not change the analysis and structure of the solution 
approach. To distinguish parameters and variables for trucks from those for private vehicles, we adopt 
superscript “tr” and “pr”, respectively. 
The unit cost to each traveler on a specific path is denoted by the effective unit path delay operator ( ), ,pr trp t h hΨ , which is defined by the addition of travel cost and penalty cost: 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,pr tr pr tr pr trp p p At h h D t h h F t D t h h T p⎡ ⎤Ψ = + + − ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ , 
where ( ), , ,  pr trpD t h h p∀ ∈Ρ  denotes the unit delay on path p  and Ρ  is the set of all paths employed by 
travelers. t  denotes the departure time and ,pr trh h  denote vectors of flows/departure rates (number of 
vehicles/trucks entering a path per unit time) of private vehicles and trucks, respectively. A more rigorous 
definition of h  can be found in Friesz (2010) and for simplicity is not stated here. ( ), ,pr trpD t h h  is an 
explicit function of the traveler’s departure time but an implicit function of the other travelers’ (including 
trucks’ and private vehicles’) travel behaviors. The quantification of ( ), ,pr trpD t h h  is discussed in detail 
in Section 3.2. ( ), ,pr trp AF t D t h h T⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦  denotes early/late arrival penalties and the following equations 
hold: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
if , , , , , 0
if , , , , , 0
if , , , , , 0
pr tr pr tr
p A p A
pr tr pr tr
p A p A
pr tr pr tr
p A p A
t D t h h T F t D t h h T
t D t h h T F t D t h h T
t D t h h T F t D t h h T
⎧ ⎡ ⎤+ > + − >⎣ ⎦⎪⎪ ⎡ ⎤+ < + − >⎨ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎡ ⎤⎪ + = + − =⎣ ⎦⎩
. 
For simplicity, in this paper we assume a quadratic penalty function [ ] 2F x xα=  where α  is a constant. 
To satisfy the travel demand for all private vehicles, the following flow conservation law must hold: 
( ) ( )
0
,f
ij
t pr pr
p ijt
p
h t dt Q i j W
∈Ρ
= ∀ ∈∑ ∫ , 
where ( ),i j  is an O-D pair and W  is the set of all O-D pairs. 1prijQ ++∈ℜ  is the fixed travel demand on O-
D pair ( ),i j  for private vehicles and ijΡ ⊂ Ρ  is a set of paths that connect O-D pair ( ),i j . 
The set of all feasible private vehicle flows can then be defined as 
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( ) ( ) ( )
0
2
0 00 : , ,
f
ij
tpr pr pr
p p ij ft
p
h h t dt Q i j W L t t
Ρ
+
∈Ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪ ⎡ ⎤Λ = ≥ = ∀ ∈ ⊂⎨ ⎬ ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑ ∫ . 
 
Theorem 1. A vector of path flows * 0h ∈Λ  is a DUE if  
( ) ( )* *0, ,p ij p ijh t p t h t v⎡ ⎤> ∈Ρ ⇒ Ψ =⎣ ⎦  
where ( ) ( )inf , : , ,ij p ijv ess t h p i j W⎡ ⎤= Ψ ∈Ρ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ .  
 
Proof. See Friesz et al. (1993).    □ 
 
Let’s denote this equilibrium by ( )0 0, , , fDUE t tΨ Λ . 
 
Theorem 2. ( )0 0, , , fDUE t tΨ Λ  is equivalent to the following differential variational inequality (DVI): 
( )( ) ( )
0
*
* *
0
find  such that
, 0 , , ,f
ij
t
p p p fp t
h
t h h h dt DVI t t
h
∈Ρ
⎫∈Λ ⎪⎪Ψ − ≥ Ψ Λ⎬⎪∀ ∈Λ ⎪⎭
∑ ∫  
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00 : , 0, ,
ij
ij
p ij ij f ijp
dy
h h t y t y t Q i j W
dt ∈Ρ
⎧ ⎫Λ = ≥ = = = ∀ ∈⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑  and ( )ijy t  stands for the 
volume of traffic that arrived at destination j  at time t .  
 
Proof. See Friesz et al. (2011).    □ 
 
In our model, given path flow of trucks, that of private vehicles will follow DUE. So the associated 
DVI formulation is 
( )( ) ( )
0
*
* *
0
find  such that
, , 0 , , ,f
ij
pr
t pr tr pr pr pr
p p p fp t
pr
h
t h h h h dt DVI t t
h
∈Ρ
⎫∈Λ ⎪⎪Ψ − ≥ Ψ Λ⎬⎪⎪∀ ∈Λ ⎭
∑ ∫
                            
(1) 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00 : , 0, ,
ij
pr
ijpr pr pr pr pr
p ij ij f ijp
dy
h h t y t y t Q i j W
dt ∈Ρ
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪Λ = ≥ = = = ∀ ∈⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑  and ( )
pr
ijy t  stands for 
the volume of private vehicles that arrived at destination j  at time t .  
To solve (1), the evaluation of ( ), ,pr trp t h hΨ  given prh  and trh  is necessary and it requires the 
quantification of ( ), ,pr trpD t h h  through dynamic network loading (DNL) which can be based on a link 
delay model (LDM).  
 
3.2 Link Delay Model Based Dynamic Network Loading with Inhomogeneous Traffic 
Dynamic network loading (DNL) refers to “the determination of arc-specific volumes, arc-specific 
exit rates and experienced path delay when departure rates are known for each path” (Friesz et al. 2011). 
With this process, DUE can be solved efficiently.  
Additional notation is necessary. Each path can be represented by a sequence of connected arcs 
( ){ }1 2, , , , ,i m pp a a a a= … …  where ( )m p  denotes the total number of arcs contained in path p . Flows of 
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trucks and private vehicles that travel along path p  exiting arc ia  are denoted by 
,
i
p tr
ag  and 
,
i
p pr
ag , 
respectively. Volume of trucks and private vehicles traveling along path p  on arc ia  are denoted by 
,
i
p tr
ax  
and ,
i
p pr
ax , respectively. 
It is straightforward to derive the following arc dynamics: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
1
,
,
,
, ,
, ,
0 0
,
,
,
, ,
,
0 0
, 2,
, 1,
, 2,
i
i i
i i
i
i i
i i
p pr
a pr p pr
p a
p pr
a p pr p pr
a a
p pr p pr
a a
p tr
a tr p tr
p a
p tr
a p tr p tr
a a
p tr p
a a
dx t
h t g t p
dt
dx t
g t g t p i m p
dt
x t x p i m p
dx t
h t g t p
dt
dx t
g t g t p i m p
dt
x t x
−
−
= − ∀ ∈Ρ
= − ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= − ∀ ∈Ρ
= − ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= ( ), , 1,tr p i m p
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎭
                              (2) 
where ,0i
p pr
ax  and 
,
0i
p tr
ax  are initial volume of private vehicles and trucks traveling along path p  on arc ia . 
Let’s define  
1, if arc  belongs to path p
0, otherwisei
i
a p
aδ ⎧= ⎨⎩ . 
The total private vehicle volume on a specific arc ia  at time t is  
( ) ( ),
i i i
ij
pr p pr
a a p a
p
x t x tδ
∈Ρ
= ∑ . 
The total truck volume on a specific arc ia  at time t is  
( ) ( ),
i i i
ij
tr p tr
a a p a
p
x t x tδ
∈Ρ
= ∑ . 
The unit path delay equals the accumulated delays on arcs that compose the path. We denote the delay 
that a vehicle will experience when it enters arc ia  at time t  by ( )( )i ia aD x t , which is a function of the 
traffic volume on arc ia  at time t. For simplicity, we assume a linear delay function, that is, 
( )
i i ia a a
D x A B x= +
 
where 
ia
A  and 
ia
B  are two positive constants. Considering the fact that the size of a 
truck may be different from that of a private vehicle thus may have a greater impact on congestion than a 
private vehicle, we assume that 
( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
pr tr
a a ax t x t x tβ= +  
where β  is a constant and is greater than or equal to 1. 
If a vehicle enters path p  at time t , we denote its exit time from arc ia  of path p  by ( )ipa tτ  and we 
have 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
, 2,
i i i i i
p
a a a
p p p
a a a a a
t t D x t p P
t t D x t p P i m p
τ
τ τ τ− −
⎡ ⎤= + ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + ∀ ∈ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
. 
By applying the chain rule, we can derive the following flow propagation constraints based on the 
above exit time functions (see Friesz et al. (2001) for more details): 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
,
,
, ,
,
1
1
1 , 2,
1
i i i i i i i
i i i i i i
p pr pr
a a a a a a p
p tr tr
a a a a a a p
p pr p pr
a a a a a a a
p tr
a a a a a a
g t D x t D x t x h t p
g t D x t D x t x h t p
g t D x t D x t x g t p i m p
g t D x t D x t x g
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ + = ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ + = ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ + = ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ + =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦



 ( ) ( )
1
, , 2,
i
p tr
a t p i m p−
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎭
 
where as defined earlier ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑
Ρ∈
+=
ij
iiii
p
trp
a
prp
apaa txtxtx
,, βδ . In the above flow propagation constraints, 
the superscript “⇔” denotes differentiation with respect to the associated function argument and the 
overdot “x” refers to differentiation with respect to time. 
The time shifts ( [ ]
ia
t D+ ⋅ ) in the above flow propagation constraints complicate the computation of 
the solution of DNL. We adopt the approximation proposed by Friesz et al. (2011) to simplify the 
network loading procedure. By defining ( ) ( ) ( ), 1,i
i
p
ap
a
dg t
r t p i m p
dt
= ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , the flow propagation 
constraints can be approximated by  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
1
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
, , ,
, , , 2,
, , ,
, , , 2,
⎫= ∀ ∈Ρ ⎪⎪⎪⎪= ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎪⎬⎪= ∀ ∈Ρ ⎪⎪⎪= ∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎭
i
i
i
i
p pr
a p pr
a
p pr
a p pr
a
p tr
a p tr
a
p tr
a p tr
a
dr t
R x g r h p
dt
dr t
R x g r p i m p
dt
dr t
R x g r h p
dt
dr t
R x g r p i m p
dt
                                     (3) 
where 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
, ,
,
2 2
, ,,
,
2 2
22
, , ,
1
22
, ,
1
,
i i i ii
i
i i i i i i i
p pr p prpr
a a a app pr
a
a a a a a a a
p pr p prp pr
a a a aap pr
a
a a a a a a a
g t r t D x th t
R x g r h
D x t D x t x D x t
p
g t r t D x tg t
R x g r
D x t D x t x D x t
p i
−
⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦= −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦= −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∀ ∈Ρ ∈


( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
, ,
,
2 2
, ,,
,
2
2,
22
, , ,
1
22
, ,
1
i i i ii
i
i i i i i i i
p tr p trtr
a a a app tr
a
a a a a a a a
p tr p trp tr
a a a aap tr
a
a a a a a a a
m p
g t r t D x th t
R x g r h
D x t D x t x D x t
p
g t r t D x tg t
R x g r
D x t D x t x D x t
−
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦= −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤+ ⎣ ⎦= −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦


( )
2
, 2,p i m p∀ ∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
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Theorem 3. If (2) and (3) satisfy the following regularity conditions: 
(a). the arc exit time functions ( )
i
p
a tτ  for all i are strictly monotonic; 
(b). the arc delay functions ( )( )i ia aD x t  for all i are bounded and strictly positive; 
(c). ( )( )i ia aD x t′′ exists and is continuous; 
(d). ( )trph t  and ( )prph t  are continuous. 
there exists a unique solution to (2) and (3). 
 
Proof. Per Walter (1988), a unique solution to (2) and (3) exists if the right-hand side of each differential 
equation in (2) and (3) is continuously differentiable with respect to , , , ,,  ,  ,  ,   and 
i i i i i i
pr tr p pr p tr p pr p tr
a a a a a ax x g g r r . It 
is obvious that the differential equations in (2) have this property. The remaining effort is on proving that 
those in (3) have the same property, that is, , ,,  
i i
p pr p tr
a aR R  are differentiable with respect to 
, , , ,,  ,  ,  ,   and 
i i i i i i
pr tr p pr p tr p pr p tr
a a a a a ax x g g r r . For simplicity, here we just show the closed-form expressions for 
those derivatives of 
1
,p pr
aR  and 1
,p tr
aR , similar results can be established for 
,
i
p pr
aR  and 
,
i
p tr
aR  for 
( )2,i m p∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
It is not difficult to derive the following closed-form expressions for derivatives of ,
i
p pr
aR  and 
,
i
p tr
aR : 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 11 1
1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 11 1
1
1 1
1
, ,,, ,
2 4
,, ,
42
2
p pr p prp prp pr p pr
a a a a a a a aa a aa a pr
apr tr
a a a a a a
p trp tr p tr
a a aa a tr
apr tr
a a a a
g t r t D x t D x t D x tr t D x tR R
X
x x D x t D x t
p
r t D x tR R
X
x x D x
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+⎡ ⎤′∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦= = − +∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤′∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦= = −∂ ∂ ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 11 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
, ,
2 4
, ,
2 2 2, ,
,
,
4
22
1
2
p tr p tr
a a a a a a a a
a a
p pr p prpr
a aa ap
p pr pr p pra a a a a p a a a
p tr tr
a p
p tr
a
g t r t D x t D x t D x t
t D x t
p
D x tR g th t
p
g D x t D x t h t g t D x t
R h
g
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤′∂ ⎣ ⎦= − ∀ ∈Ρ∂ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∂ =∂
( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
,
2 2 2,
, ,
, ,
2
1
2
p tr
a a a
tr p tr
a a a a p a a a
p pr p tr
a a
p pr p tr
a a a a
D x t g tt
p
D x t D x t h t g t D x t
R R
p
r r D x t
⎡ ⎤′ ⎣ ⎦ − ∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∂ ∂= − ∀ ∈Ρ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
where 
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( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 2,
4 2,
,
2
1
2
1
2 1
pr pr pr
p a apr
a
pr p pr
a a a a p a
tr tr tr
p a atr
a
pr p tr
a a a a p a
pr pr p pr
a a a a a a a p a
h t Y Z
X p
D x t D x t h t g t
h t Y Z
X p
D x t D x t ht t g t
Y D x t D x t D x t h t g t p
− += ∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− += ∀ ∈Ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′+ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′ ′= + − ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
,
2 ,
2 ,
2 1tr tr p tra a a a a a a p a
pr pr p pr
a a a a a p a
tr tr p tr
a a a a a p a
Y D x t D x t D x t h t g t p
Z D x t D x t h t g t p
Z D x t D x t h t g t p
Ρ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′ ′= + − ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′′= − ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′′= − ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
Thus the theorem is proven.    □ 
 
So given prh  and trh  as constants, solving (2) and (3), also known as the differential algebraic 
equation (DAE) system, we can evaluate ( )
ia
x t , ( )
i ia a
D x t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and ( )ipa tτ  for all ( ), 2,p i m p∈Ρ ∈⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , and 
then quantify unit path delay using the following function 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )11 i i m pm p p p pp a a aiD t t t t tτ τ τ−= ⎡ ⎤= − = −⎣ ⎦∑ . 
It was first proven by Friesz et al. (1993) that a closed-form formulation of DUE can preserve first-in-
first-out (FIFO) rule under mild assumptions. In the remaining of this section, we prove a similar result 
for DUE with inhomogeneous traffic. 
First we need to introduce the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1. If function :f ℜ→ℜ  is invertible and differentiable with a derivative f ′ : 
( ) ( )1 11f z f f z− −′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤=⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Proof. See Friesz et al. (1993). 
 
Now we can demonstrate the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 4. For an arc delay function ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )txtxBAtxD trapraaaaa iiiiii β++= , the resulting arc exit time 
function 
iaτ  is strictly increasing thus invertible. Consequently, the FIFO rule is satisfied. 
 
Proof. We partition the time into appropriate intervals and assume without loss of generality that 
( ) ( ) 000 == trapra ii xx . We in addition assume that the first vehicle enters arc ia  at time 0 and it does not 
matter whether it is a private vehicle or a truck. We denote the time that the first vehicle exits arc ia  by 1t  
and we have by definition ( )
ii aa ADt == 01  
and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]100 ,0, ttdssudssutxtxtx
t tr
a
t pr
a
tr
a
pr
aa iiiii
∈∀+=+= ∫∫ ββ  
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where ( ) ( )∑
∈
=
Pp
pa
pr
p
pr
a ii
thtu δ  and ( ) ( )∑
∈
=
Pp
pa
tr
p
tr
a ii thtu δ  denote the flow of private vehicles and trucks 
entering arc ia  , respectively. 
Hence for any [ ]1,0 tt∈ , we denote the exit time function by ( )tia,1τ , and we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +++=+= ∫∫ t trat praaaaa dssudssuBAttDtt iiiiii 00,1 βτ . 
Note that ( )0,11 iat τ=  and ( )tia,1τ  is differentiable with 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tutuBt trapraaa iiii βτ ++=′ 1,1                                                        (i) 
which is strictly positive since 
iaB  is positive and ( )tu prai  and ( )tutrai  are nonnegative. Hence, ( )tia,1τ  is 
increasing on [ ]1,0 t  and a well defined inverse function ( )tia1,1−τ  exists on ( ) ( )[ ]111 ,0 taa ττ . 
Let ( )12 1 tt aτ= , ( ) ( )[ ] [ ]211 ,,0 11 tttaa ≡ττ . 
Note that the commuters traveling on arc ia  at time [ ]21, ttt∈  are those who entered the arc during the 
interval ( )[ ]tt
ia ,
1
,1
−τ . Hence, if we denote the exit time for commuters entering arc ia  during the interval 
[ ]21, tt  by ( )tia,2τ , then for all [ ]21, ttt∈ , 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++= ∫∫ −− t t trat t praaaa ia iia iiii dssudssuBAtt 1,11,1,2 ττ βτ  
and ( ) ( ) 21,11,2 ttt ii aa ==ττ . 
The derivative of ( )t
ia,2τ  is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ] ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )( ) 0
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1,1
1
,1
1
,1,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1
1
,1,2
≥+>
++−+=
++−+++−+=
′−+′−+=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−+′−+=′
−−
−−
−
−−
−
−
−
−
−
−−−−
tutuB
tutuB
tutuB
tutuB
tuB
tuB
tutuB
tuB
tuB
t
tuB
tuB
t
tuB
tuB
ttututtutuBt
tr
a
pr
aa
a
tr
aa
pr
aa
tr
a
pr
aa
a
tr
aa
pr
aa
a
tr
aatr
aa
a
tr
aa
pr
aa
a
pr
aapr
aa
aa
a
tr
aatr
aa
aa
a
pr
aapr
aa
aa
tr
a
tr
aaa
pr
a
pr
aaa
iii
iiiii
iii
iiiii
iii
ii
iiiii
iii
ii
ii
iii
ii
ii
iii
ii
iiiiiiiiii
β
τβτβ
τβτ
τββτβτ
τ
ττ
τββττ
τ
ττββτττ
 
The second and third equalities are derived using Lemma 1 and equation (i), respectively. 
Thus, we can again conclude that ( )t
ia,2τ  is increasing on [ ]21, tt  and a well defined inverse function 
( )t
ia
1
,2
−τ  exists on ( ) ( )[ ]21 11 , tt aa ττ . 
We proceed by induction. For n = 2, we have already shown that  
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++= ∫∫ −− t t trat t praaaa ia iia iiii dssudssuBAtt 1,11,1,2 ττ βτ  ( ) ( ) 21,11,2 ttt ii aa ==ττ  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0,2 ≥+>′ tutuBt trapraaa iiii βτ  
Then we choose any 2>k . Suppose that for kn = , the exit time function ( )t
iak ,τ  is invertible and the 
following conditions hold: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++= ∫∫ −−−− t t trat t praaaak iak iiak iiii dssudssuBAtt 1 ,11 ,1, ττ βτ                                   (ii) ( ) ( ) kkakkak ttt ii == −−− 1,11, ττ                                                              (iii) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )tutuBt trapraaak iiii βτ +>′ ,  for all [ ]kk ttt ,1−∈                                           (iv) 
We wish to show that for n = k + 1, if denote ( )kakk tt i,1 τ=+ , then the exit time function ( )kak ti,1+τ  
satisfies the following conditions: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++= ∫∫ −−+ t t trat t praaaak iak iiak iiii dssudssuBAtt 1,1,,1 ττ βτ                                    (v) ( ) ( ) 1,,1 ++ == kkakkak ttt ii ττ                                                              (vi) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )tutuBt trapraaak iiii βτ +>′+ ,1  for all [ ]1, +∈ kk ttt                                          (vii) 
By definition, it is not difficult to show that equation (v) is satisfied. So we only need to derive 
equations (vi) and (viii) in the rest of this proof. 
First, similar to the derivation of ( )t
ia,2τ ′  we can show equation (vii) by the following: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ]
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )
( ) ( )( ) 0
1
1
1
1
1
,
1
,
1
,,
1
,
1
,,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,,1
≥+>
++−+=
′−+′−+=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′−+′−+=′
−−
−
−
−
−
−−−−
+
tutuB
tutuB
tutuB
t
tuB
tuB
t
tuB
tuB
ttututtutuBt
tr
a
pr
aa
ak
tr
aak
pr
aa
tr
a
pr
aa
akak
ak
tr
aatr
aa
akak
ak
pr
aapr
aa
akak
tr
a
tr
aakak
pr
a
pr
aaak
iii
iiiii
iii
ii
iii
ii
ii
iii
ii
iiiiiiiiii
β
τβτβ
ττ
τββττ
τ
ττββτττ
 
Then by equation (iii) and the assumed invertibility of ( )t
iak ,τ  and ( )tiak ,1−τ , we have 
( )kakk tt i1,1 −− = τ  and ( )11 ,11 −−−− = kakk tt iτ . 
This together with equation (v) yields 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )kak
t
t
tr
a
t
t
pr
aaak
t
t
tr
a
t
t
pr
aaak
t
t
tr
a
t
t
pr
aaakkak
t
dssudssuBAt
dssudssuBAt
dssudssuBAtt
i
k
kiak
i
k
kiak
iii
k
k
i
k
k
iii
k
kiak
i
k
kiak
iiii
,
,1
1
1
,11
1
,1
11
1
,
1
,
τ
β
β
βτ
ττ
ττ
=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +++=
∫∫
∫∫
∫∫
−−−−−−
−−
−−+
 
and thus equation (vi) holds. 
Consequently, the exit time function ( )t
iaτ  is everywhere continuous and increasing on +ℜ  which 
indicates that ( ) ( )21 tt ii aa ττ >  if 21 tt > . Thus the FIFO rule holds.    □ 
 
3.3 Formulation of the Stackelberg Game 
In the proposed Stackelberg game, the leader (the truck company) aims at minimizing its total cost 
while satisfying the travel demand over the time frame of interest, which can be represented by (4) and 
(5), respectively: 
( )
0
*min , ,f
ij
t pr tr tr
p pp t
t h h h dt∈Ρ Ψ∑ ∫                                                         (4) 
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( ) ( )
0
,  0    ,f
ij
t tr tr tr
p ij pt
p
h t dt Q h i j W
∈Ρ
= ≥ ∀ ∈∑ ∫                                                  (5) 
where  
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,pr tr pr tr pr trp p p At h h D t h h F t D t h h T p⎡ ⎤Ψ = + + − ∀ ∈Ρ⎣ ⎦ . 
Then the problem can be represented by {(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)} which is a dynamic mathematical program 
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). 
In (4), *prh  stands for the vector of equilibrium flows of private vehicles and trh  is the vector of truck 
flows. Equation (4) minimizes the total effective delay experienced by all the trucks that travel on the 
network in time interval 0 , ft t⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . Equation (5) is the demand consumption constraint for trucks. (4) and (5) 
compose the upper level of the dynamic MPEC. (1), (2) and (3) which characterize the equilibrium flows 
of private vehicles compose the lower level of the dynamic MPEC.  
Existence of solutions to this dynamic MPEC is a crucial issue. It is resolved if we can show that for 
any set of truck flows ( ) ,  trph t p∀  that are feasible to (5), (1) has a solution, that is, *prh . If ( ), ,pr trp t h hΨ  
for all p is continuous and the feasible set Λ  in (1) is compact, the fixed point theory of multi-valued 
mappings in topological vector spaces discussed by Browder (1968) can be applied to show that there 
exists a solution to (1). So, existence results are general if the DUE is based on the formulation (1). 
However, a rigorous proof of existence when regularity conditions are imposed entirely on the path delay 
operators without the assumption that the path flows are a priori bounded from above is still challenging 
and remains to be addressed by future studies.  
 
4. ALGORITHM DESIGN 
Although a rigorous proof is not available, we still have a general property of existence of solutions 
and we can develop or apply an algorithm to find the solution. Since the dynamic MPEC is nonconvex 
and the DNL process in solving the lower level DUE requires complex nested calculations, we 
reformulate the problem as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC), which is 
a single-level problem computable by standard optimization techniques. In particular, the DUE is 
formulated as the following complementarity problem: 
Ψ p t,hppr ,hptr( ) − μij( ) ⊥ hppr   ∀p ∈ij
Ψ p t,hppr ,hptr( ) − μij ≥ 0        ∀p ∈ij
hpr ≥ 0
                                                     (6) 
where   hpr ∈Λ , and  μ := μij : ij ∈W( ) . With complementarity constraints (6) substituted for DUE (1), the 
MPCC reformulation of the proposed urban freight model can be represented by {(2), (3), (4), (5), (6)}. 
Since the complementarity constraints might not satisfy certain constraint qualifications that are 
necessary to guarantee convergence of the solution (Rodrigues and Monteiro, 2006), to solve the MPCC, 
we penalize the complementarity constraints and obtain the augmented objective function as: 
U h pr ,htr ,μ, M( )
:= Ψ p t,h pr ,htr( )hptr dtt0t f∫p∈Ρ ij∑
 + M Ψ p t,hppr ,hptr( ) − μw( )hppr⎡⎣ ⎤⎦2 dtt0t f∫p∈Ρ ij∑
 + M max μij −Ψ p t,hppr ,hptr( ),0{ }⎡⎣ ⎤⎦2 dtt0t f∫p∈Ρ ij∑
                                     (7) 
where M is a large number.  
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By substituting (7) for (4), we have finalized the urban freight transportation planning problem as a 
single-level nonlinear program {(2), (3), (5), (6), (7)}. We design the following projected gradient 
algorithm to solve this nonlinear program. 
 
Projected gradient algorithm: 
Step 0. Initialization. Identify an initial feasible solution uk := hpr ,k ,htr ,k ,μijk( )T  and set k = 0; 
Step 1. Solve the optimal control subproblem: 
 
min
v
1
2
h pr ,k t( ) −αF1 t,h pr ,k t( ),htr ,k t( ),μ k( ) − hpr t( ) 22 dtt0t f∫
+ 1
2
htr ,k t( ) −αF2 t,hpr ,k t( ),htr ,k t( ),μ k( ) − htr t( ) 22 dtt0t f∫
+ 1
2
μ k −αF3 t,h pr ,k t( ),htr ,k t( ),μ k( ) − μ 22 dtt0t f∫
s.t.
dyij
pr t( )
dt
= hppr t( )
p∈Pij
∑
dyij
tr t( )
dt
= hptr t( )
p∈Pij
∑
yij
pr t0( ) = 0, yijpr t f( ) = Qijpr
yij
tr t0( ) = 0, yijtr t f( ) = Qijtr
 
Denote the solution by uk+1 := h pr ,k+1,htr ,k+1,μ k+1( )T . 
Step 2. Stop if uk+1 − uk ≤ ε1, where ε1 ∈ℜ++1  is a preset scalar. Otherwise, set M = CM, go to Step 1. 
 
In the pseudo-code, F1 := ∂U ∂h pr , F2 := ∂U ∂htr , F3 := ∂U ∂μ  and C are constants that are great 
than 1. Note that since the problem is nonconvex in general, by the proposed solution approach, only local 
optimal solutions can be guaranteed.  
 
5. NUMERICAL TEST 
The algorithm is tested on Nguyen-Dupuis network which consists of 19 nodes and 25 links as shown 
by Figure 1. We set 0 100, 175ft t= =  and define a desired arrival time 160AT =  for the trucks as well as 
private vehicles. This planning horizon is then discretized into 300 time intervals and each of which is 
0.25 time units long. Each time unit represents 1 minute in the real world. 
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Figure 1 Nguyen-Dupuis network 
 
 
Specifically, we focus on the set of O-D pairs ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1,2 , 1,3 , 4,2 , 4,3W =  with each O-D pair 
having a fixed travel demand. Four test scenarios are considered. They are: 
( )
Scenario 1: 15000,  5000
Scenario 2: 15000,  2500
, ,
Scenario 3: 15000,  500
Scenario 4: 15000,  0
pr tr
ij ij
pr tr
ij ij
pr tr
ij ij
pr tr
ij ij
Q Q
Q Q
i j W
Q Q
Q Q
⎧ = =⎪ = =⎪⎪ ∀ ∈⎨ = =⎪⎪ = =⎪⎩
. 
We assume that in ( )
i i ia a a
D x A B x= + , except that 1.5
ia
A =  for i = 1, 7, 13, 15 and 19, and 2.5
ia
A =  
for i = 4, for remaining arcs 2
ia
A = . 46.67 10
ia
B −= ×  for all arcs. We also assume that the trucks and 
private vehicles have the same length, that is, in ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
pr tr
a a ax t x t x tβ= + , 1β = . We set 5.0=α  in 
early/late arrival penalties [ ] 2F x xα= . 
The solution approach is coded in MATLAB 7 and GAMS and solved on Penn State Lion-X system 
with the following attributes: Intel Xeon E5450 Quad-Core 3.0 GHz and 64GB RAM.  
In the rest of this section, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 address the following questions respectively.  
z Will the interaction of freight and personal transportation influence the traffic flow pattern? 
z To the truck company, what is the value of incorporating the interaction of freight and personal 
transportation? 
z What managerial insight does the model bring to a MPO? 
 
5.1 Traffic Flow Pattern 
The “optimal” truck flows and equilibrium private vehicle flows are solved by the proposed algorithm. 
Since there are in total 25 paths that connect the 4 O-D pairs, without loss of generality we only analyze 
the time-varying traffic flows on Path 10 (Arcs 9, 14, 15 and 18 that connect O-D pair (4, 3)) in each 
scenario as illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2 Dynamic traffic flows on Path 10 in 4 scenarios 
 
In Figure 2, (a), (b), (c) and (d) show the dynamic traffic flows and the effective delay on Path 1 in 
Scenario 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. We can see that in all of these 4 scenarios, traffic flows exist only 
when the effective delay is at its minimum and the peak of the private vehicle flows occurs at around time 
140 which can be considered as the appropriate departure time for private vehicles in order to arrive at the 
destination at the desired time aT . From Figure 2, we can clearly identify the interaction of freight and 
personal transportation. As an example, in Scenario 3 (Figure 2(c)) when there are in total 500 trucks 
traveling on the network, the private vehicle flow significantly differs from that in Scenario 4 (Figure 2(d)) 
when there is no truck at all. What’s more, again in Scenario 3, the peak of private vehicle flow occurs 
earlier that in Scenario 4. It is not intuitive why the traffic flow pattern in Scenario 3 significantly differs 
from those in Scenario 1 and 2. However, since the truck company optimizes its transportation cost over 
the entire network and Figure 2 just illustrates traffic flow pattern on one of the 25 paths of the network, 
such a result is not surprising. 
 
5.2 Comparative Study 
By Figure 2, we have demonstrated that there exist interactions between truck and private vehicles 
even when the number of trucks is relatively small. We would like to further estimate the importance of 
considering such an interaction in truck scheduling by considering two cases. In Case 1, the truck 
company ignores the interaction and it simply assumes that the private vehicles will follow DUE without 
taking into account the truck flows. It estimates the effective delay operator under the regular DUE and 
uses it as the cost coefficient to optimize truck flows. Let’s mark the optimal solution in this case as ( )trph . 
However, as we know, the truck flow will influence the private vehicle flow so that given ( )trph , the real 
DUE flow for private vehicles is different from its estimation and thus the real effective delay operator is 
not the same as estimated. Thus in Case 1, the real total cost should be calculated using the real effective 
(a)    (b) 
(c)    (d) 
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delay operator. Let’s mark the real total cost as z0. In Case 2, the truck company considers the interaction 
while optimizing truck flow and the optimal solution will be exactly the solution to the MPCC {(2), (3), 
(5), (6), (7)}. In Case 2, the minimal total cost is also the real total cost and let’s mark it as z1. We then 
compare z0 and z1 in Scenario 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1 which shows that in all 3 scenarios considering the 
interaction can help reduce the total cost to the truck company significantly, especially when freight 
transportation accounts for a considerable portion of total traffic. The computation time is summarized in 
Table 2 and it is not surprising that in Case 2 the computation time in each scenario is much greater than 
its counterpart in Case 1 since in Case 1 the original problem is just single-level optimization thus does 
not involve iterative updates of DUE for private vehicles. However, considering the significant reduction 
in cost, it is still worth incorporating the interaction of freight and personal transportation for the truck 
company while making truck schedules. 
 
Table 1 Comparison of total cost 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
z0 1.42×107 4.52×106 7.99×105 
z1 2.58×107 7.30×106 9.09×105 
Reduction 44.90% 38.16% 12.12% 
 
Table 2 Comparison of computation time (in second) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Case 1 2180.46 1760.42 1851.65 
Case 2 27408.29 29994.63 63580.18 
 
5.3 Braess-Like Paradox in Dynamic Stackelberg Game 
So far in this paper, we have demonstrated that the interaction of freight and personal transportation 
should be considered when a truck company schedules its freight transportation in order to save cost. In 
this subsection, we want to address the concern of a MPO whose objective is to minimize total social cost, 
the cost to the all owners of private vehicles and the truck company, while ensuring that the travel 
demand is satisfied. A possible approach is to make a policy to restrict trucks from entering a portion of 
the network. However, it is not necessarily reducing the total cost since the transportation cost to the truck 
company may soar. So if it works, we actually come across a Braess-like Paradox: reducing capacity of a 
network for partial road users who selfishly select their routes can increase overall performance (see 
Akamatsu and Heydecker (2003) and Lin and Lo (2009) for more details about the dynamic extension of 
Braess Paradox). Note that since the MPO knows exactly that the truck company and the owners of 
private vehicles play a Stackelberg game, the problem is actually a tri-level optimization problem. To 
simplify the formulation and solution of the problem, we explore the existence of such Braess-like 
paradoxes by a trial-and-error approach. We arbitrarily choose one arc at a time from the network to be 
blocked for trucks. Then we conduct numerical test to check whether blocking that arc for trucks can 
reduce the total cost: if yes, then we find the Braess-like paradox and we can stop; if no, we choose 
another arc and repeat the numerical test and the judgment of result. After several iterations, we find that 
blocking all the trucks from entering Arc 12 during the time interval of our interest can reduce the total 
cost (see Figure 3). More details of this policy are summarized in Table 3. 
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Figure 3 Nguyen-Dupuis network with Arc 12 blocked for all trucks 
 
Table 3 Braess-like Paradox 
 Total Cost Truck Company’s Cost Computation time (in second) 
All arcs are accessible 3.16×107 4.52×106 29994.63 
Arc 12 blocked for trucks 3.11×107 5.02×106 23082.89 
Improvement 1.6% -11.1% 23.0% 
 
From Table 3, we know that the MPO can block trucks from entering Arc 12 to reduce total cost by 
1.6%. However, it may increase the truck company’s cost by 11.1%. So before the MPO implement such 
a policy, it should consider the possible obstruction from the truck company and try to balance the 
increase in social welfare and the loss in the truck company’s profit. As an example resolution, the MPO 
may compensate the truck company for restricting its travel right.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we model urban freight transportation planning by a dynamic Stackelberg game and 
formulate the problem as a dynamic MPEC. In particular, we assume that there is a truck company trying 
to minimize its freight transportation cost which is dependent on its transportation plan and the 
background traffic such as personal transportation. The model explicitly characterizes the interaction of 
freight and personal transportation by its lower level problem, that is, DUE with inhomogeneous traffic, 
and optimizes the truck schedule in the upper level which is an SO problem. To obtain local optimal 
solutions and achieve efficient computation, we reformulate the MPEC as a MPCC and design a projected 
gradient algorithm to solve it. Numerical results show that the interaction between different road users - 
specifically, a trucking company and individuals, exists and is nonnegligible even when the amount of 
trucks compared to that of private vehicles is small, and demonstrate that significant cost reduction can be 
achieved if the truck company schedules freight transportation considering this interaction, which 
supports our concern that in an urban network personal transportation should not be ignored while 
scheduling freight transportation. Moreover, with extensive numerical tests we find a Braess-like paradox 
in this dynamic bi-level transportation planning problem which implicates that a MPO may increase 
social welfare by restricting trucks from entering specific sections of the network during peak hours of a 
day. At the same time, since the restriction may significantly increase the truck company’s cost, the MPO 
could compensate the truck company in order to smooth the implementation of the restriction.  
Some interesting extensions of this study include but not limited to the following: (1) comprehensively 
investigate the dynamic Braess-like paradox based on the proposed modeling framework and discuss the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the paradox to occur; (2) robustify the problem by incorporating 
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uncertain travel demand; (3) model the upper level problem as service network design problem which is 
more realistic yet more challenging; (4) assume that there exist multiple truck companies competing with 
each other and study the resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC).  
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